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Abstract. This article investigates consumer protection on Kickstarter—a popular and
sizeable, yet largely unregulated reward-based crowdfunding platform. Speciﬁcally, the
article focuses on Kickstarter campaigns’ use of price advertising claims (PACs) and their
failure to honor the promised discounts. Analyses show that between 2009 and 2016, more
than 500,000 consumers who backed a wide variety of game or technology campaigns lost
on average $45.72 because of broken PAC promises. Whereas 75% of PAC campaigns did
not provide the promised discounts, in almost 50% of all cases backers whowere promised
a discount paid more, not less, than the retail price. In contrast, backers of campaigns that
did not promise a discount received larger effective discounts. Analyzing an extensive data
set comprising 34,745 Kickstarter campaigns, complete backing histories of more than
400,000 backers, and more than 4 million consumer comments, complaints, and reviews,
we show that broken PAC promises pose a substantial problem to consumers, that the
problem is persistent across more than 6 years, and that it has not been resolved through
self-regulation by market participants thus far.
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1. Introduction
I FEEL CHEATED and LIED to. They promised retail
price no less than $9 after Kickstarter but you can buy
them on their website for $5. I thought Kickstarters were
getting a special deal.
—M. A., backer of the Brimstone campaign
The project funded with KS backers being promised
savings off retail of up to $1500. Yet they are actually
selling them right now for $1000 LESS than Kickstarter
backers paid 2 years ago!
—J. S., backer of the Scrooser campaign
Reward-based crowdfunding is no longer a niche
phenomenon. In the past decade, more than 75 mil-
lion backers have pledged more than $10 billion on
Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and GoFundMe. Yet despite
their reach, size, and age, crowdfunding platforms
still resemble more of a “wild west” environment
(Leamy 2018) than a maturing industry. The broad
absence of regulation in such a sizeable market over a
rather long period of time provides an interesting
research setting for studying consumer protection.
In this article, we investigate consumer protection on
Kickstarter, focusing speciﬁcally on price advertising
claims (PACs). PACs are a form of advertising used in
the sale of products whereby current prices are com-
pared with a suggested reference price such as former
prices, retail prices, or suggestedpricesbymanufacturers
(see Compeau andGrewal 1998 for a review and meta-
analysis of the literature). Regulators such as the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have promulgated
speciﬁc guidelines to determine the conditions under
which a PAC is deceptive and causes economic injury to
consumers. For example, if a seller makes a PAC such as
“Sold for $25 only today, 50% off the regular retail
price,” regulation requires an immediate price increase
after the end of the promotion (for example, Code. Mass.
Law, 940 C.M.R. §6.05), an actual price increase to the
stated amount (for example, FTC 16 C.F.R. Part 233), and
maintenance of the stated amount for a reasonable time
(Better Business Bureau Code of Advertising §9.4).
On Kickstarter, a campaign might ask consumers
to pay $70 to receive a product they promise will
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later have a price of $140. The key question is as
follows: “Do consumers actually get the price ad-
vantage that was promised or do they incur economic
injury because they did not?” In the example in
Figure 1, consumers on Amazon ended up paying a
retail price of $59.99 upon product launch—57% less
than what was promised ($140) and even 14% less than
what consumers on Kickstarter actually paid ($70).
We focus this article on PACs because PAC regu-
lation is widely applied in the United States and
around the world (Boddewyn 1982) and because it
remains a current topic. For example, broken PAC
promises resulting in economic injury of only $36 for
the plaintiff recently led courts to grant a class action
lawsuit that ended up costing ofﬂine retailer J.C.
Penney $50 million in a settlement (Spann v. J.C.
Penney Corp.; see Stempel 2015). Still, PAC regulation
has not been enforced on Kickstarter thus far.
Anecdotal evidence regarding PACs—as in the
introductory quotes by angry Kickstarter backers or
in the example in Figure 1—points toward potential
problems. If the anecdotal evidence is indeed in-
dicative of a systematic and unresolved consumer pro-
tection problem, it might affect hundreds of thousands
of consumers who could incur substantial economic
injury from broken PAC promises.
To analyze consumer protection on Kickstarter
systematically, we have compiled an extensive data
set. We match the detailed data available on Kickstarter
with information from various outside sources:
• Hand-collected prices from 1,548 webshops, as
well as from Amazon, Steam, and price aggregators
(e.g., camelcamelcamel and steamprices),
• Consumer reviews from Amazon and Steam,
• Ofﬁcial consumer complaints as ﬁled with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), the Better Business Bureau
(BBB), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB),
• Supplementary campaign data on nondelivery
of rewards fromKickscammed and fromnews articles
retrieved from CrunchBase,
• Survey data from 179 managers of successfully
funded Kickstarter campaigns and 31 crowdfunding
experts.
In total, we analyze 34,745 Kickstarter cam-
paigns, complete backing histories of 442,185 backers,
4,279,494 consumer comments, 233,701 campaign up-
dates, 1,704 blog articles from Kickstarter, 18,488 news
articles from 500 publishers (e.g., TechCrunch, Wired),
94,569 consumer reviews, and 4,432 pages of consumer
complaints ﬁled with ofﬁcial authorities.
We use this data to investigate ﬁve questions about
consumer protection on Kickstarter: (1) Is there a
substantial problem with broken PAC promises on
Kickstarter? (2) Do consumers care? (3) Did con-
sumers learn to avoid the problem? (4) Did campaign
managers take actions that solved the problem? (5)
Did Kickstarter take actions that solved the problem?
Our analyses provide the following main results:
1. There is a substantial problem with broken
PAC promises on Kickstarter. More than 75% of
consumers who fund campaigns that use PACs
(subsequently referred to as PAC campaigns) on
Kickstarter do not receive the promised discounts.
The problem is widespread and affects more than
500,000 individual backers. Products from PAC
campaigns that are later offered to the public on
average command a retail price on product launch
that is $45.72 lower than promised by the Kickstarter
campaign (the average promised price in these
campaigns is $137.34). Even worse, in almost 50%
of all cases the retail price is even lower than what
backers paid on Kickstarter. Different fromwhat PAC
campaigns promise, their backers pay more, not less,
than the retail price. All else equal, backers of cam-
paigns that did not promise a discount (subse-
quently referred to as NoPAC campaigns) on average
Figure 1. (Color online) Example for Use of PACs During Kickstarter Campaign and Lower than Promised Actual Retail Price
at Product Launch on Amazon
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received larger discounts than backers of PAC cam-
paigns. In addition to not receiving the promised
discount, consumers who funded campaigns that use
(versus do not use) PACs also have a lower likelihood
of ever receiving the product, experience longer de-
livery delays, and receive products of lower objective
quality.
2. Consumers care. All else equal, consumers who
fund campaigns that use (versus do not use) PACs on
Kickstarter are unhappier, as indicated by lower
sentiment in backers’ comments on the Kickstarter
platform, and have greater probability of ﬁling con-
sumer complaints with the FBI, FTC, BBB, SEC, or
CFPB. Also, damaged consumers vote with their feet:
consumers that did (versus did not) experience bro-
ken PAC promises ﬁrsthand are signiﬁcantly less
likely to fund another campaign on Kickstarter.
3. Consumers did not learn to avoid the problem.
We observe no PAC-speciﬁc population-level learn-
ing: all else equal, campaigns that use (versus do not
use) PACs on Kickstarter do not experience a relative
decrease in funding likelihood over time. We also do
not observe learning for (expert) subpopulations of
Kickstarter backers: a surveyed group of crowd-
funding experts does not expect PAC campaigns
to perform worse regarding savings over the retail
price, delivery likelihood, delivery delay, or prod-
uct quality. Finally, we observe no individual-level
learning: PAC campaign backers who experienced
damage ﬁrsthand do not show a disproportionate
decrease in funding likelihood for future PAC cam-
paigns (versus Kickstarter campaigns in general).
4. Campaign managers did not take actions that
solved the problem.Only 13 of our 34,745 Kickstarter
campaigns offer voluntary default-contingent signals
in the form of money-back guarantees (4 campaigns,
0.01%) or warranties (9 campaigns, 0.03%); 21 cam-
paigns (0.06%) provide default-independent signals
such as external certiﬁcations via some seal of ap-
proval. An industry-wide code of conduct has not
been adopted. Hence, there is no discernable sign of
self-regulation by campaign managers.
5. Kickstarter did not take measures that solved
the problem. Among the seven major policy updates
introduced by Kickstarter between the platform’s
start in 2009 and the end of 2016, ﬁve policy updates
protect Kickstarter (i.e., the platform), not the con-
sumer. Among the two policy changes that could help
improve consumer protection, the potentially most
impactful change (introduction of a “risk and chal-
lenges” section and prototype requirements for tech-
nology products) was introduced in September 2012.
The difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) anal-
ysis reveals no positive effect of this change on damage
from PAC (versus NoPAC) campaigns.
In summary, we ﬁnd no evidence of consumer
protection “happening automatically,” that is, with-
out regulatory intervention, during the observed six-
year period. Instead, the evidence points toward a
substantial and persistent problem with broken PAC
promises on Kickstarter.
Our study ﬁrst and foremost contributes to the
fast-growing stream of literature on reward-based
crowdfunding (see Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017a
for a review) as the ﬁrst to study consumer protection.
We explicitly focus on the consequences (rather than
the antecedents) of PAC usage, adding to the sparse
crowdfunding literature that investigates phenom-
ena after successful funding. Extant articles have mainly
focused on phenomena before successful (or unsuc-
cessful) funding of the campaign (e.g., Agrawal et al.
2015, Chan and Parhankangas 2017, Kuppuswamy
and Bayus 2017b, Younkin and Kuppuswamy 2017).
Only three articles look at what happens after cam-
paign funding. Mollick (2014) examines delays in
delivery, Roma et al. (2017) investigate how crowd-
funding performance attracts professional investors,
and Viotto da Cruz (2018) researches crowdfund-
ing as an informational mechanism by linking prod-
ucts’ crowd feedback to the probability of market
releases. In addition, our research highlights the on-
going relevance of PAC regulation (Pechmann and
Silk 2013) and speaks more broadly to the widely
debated topic of consumer protection in unregulated
markets and platform economies (Lagarde 2017,
Ohlhausen 2015).
In the remainder of the article, we detail the setting
and available data for our empirical study and discuss
the variables of interest. We then detail our identiﬁ-
cation strategy. Next, we present analyses, model-
free evidence and results along the ﬁve questions
outlined above, investigating whether there is a sub-
stantial problem and whether it matters to consumers,
whether consumers learn to avoid the problem, and
whether the problem is mitigated by self-regulation by
either campaign managers or the Kickstarter platform.
We analyze the economic relevance of our ﬁndings and
conclude with a summary, discussion of implications,
and limitations.
2. Data in the Empirical Study
2.1. Data from Kickstarter and Related Websites
Consumers learn about Kickstarter campaigns via
campaign websites that follow a standard format.
Campaigns can describe their offerings using text,
images, and videos. They specify the price of the “one
standard product, unlimited availability” reward and
potential other rewards, and inform consumers about
the delivery date, shipping options, the identity and
experience of the campaign manager, and potential
campaign risks. Finally, campaignsmust specify their
Blaseg, Schulze, and Skiera: Consumer Protection on Kickstarter
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campaign goal and a campaign end date. If the cam-
paign reaches or surpasses that goal (i.e., the campaign
is funded) by the speciﬁed date, it receives backers’
money and is obliged to deliver the reward. If the
campaign does not reach the goal, then Kickstarter
will not charge consumers’ credit cards. All of this
information, as provided by the campaign manager,
is publicly available at the start of the campaign and is
part of our data.
In our study, we speciﬁcally compare Kickstarter
campaigns that use versus do not use PACs. To
identify the use of PACs, we employ a rule-based text
mining approach on reward descriptions—a popular
approach to identifying patterns commonly observed
in texts (Netzer et al. 2012). In line with Grewal and
Compeau (1992),we identify twomain types: (1) PACs
indicating direct potential savings (e.g., “$10 less than
retail price” or “20% off retail”) and (2) PACs con-
taining a reference price (e.g., “Retail price will be
$100”). Based on this information, we determine the
promisedprice inU.S. dollars.Althoughother rewards
might exist (for example, receiving a special or limited-
edition version of the product, early bird rewards,
nontangible philanthropic rewards, or multiple prod-
ucts in a multibuy deal), we focus on the price of
the most relevant “one standard product, unlimited
availability” reward—the only reward type that is
available in all campaigns and to all consumers at any
time throughout the funding period, thus enabling us
to compare all campaigns.
Beyond providing information about the campaign,
crowdfunding websites offer a means for backers
and the campaign manager to interact. The campaign
manager can inform backers with updates about the
current status and progress. These comments and
updates are public and also part of our data.
Funded campaigns are obliged to deliver the product
to backers. However, not all campaigns succeed in
their endeavor and either entirely fail to deliver or
deliver the product late. Information on (non)de-
livery is partially available on the Kickstarter plat-
form (e.g., in the comments posted by backers and in
the updates by campaignmanagers).We augment the
information on Kickstarter through specialized third-
party platforms Kickscammed and CrunchBase to
assess the delivery status of funded campaigns.Matching
of information from third-party websites and Kickstarter
is done using campaign names. Based on this procedure,
each campaign is categorized as “delivered” (i.e., de-
liveryhas been conﬁrmed), “not delivered” (i.e., failure
has been announced), or “not delivered yet” (i.e., no
conﬁrmed delivery and no announced failure).
2.2. Data from Amazon and Steam
After successfully funded Kickstarter campaigns de-
liver the rewards to their backers, they often seek to
increase their market and sell to a broader set of con-
sumers (Mollick and Kuppuswamy 2014, Viotto da
Cruz 2018). The most relevant retail platforms are
Steam for games and Amazon for technology prod-
ucts. We identiﬁed 361 campaigns that moved on to
sell their products on these platforms. We use Steam
and Amazon to gather information about consumer
reviews of these products. Speciﬁcally, we use the
Amazon star ratings and the Steam thumbs up/
thumbs down ratings as indicators of product qual-
ity. Moreover, we gather retail prices from Amazon
and Steam directly, as well as from the websites
Steamprices and camelcamelcamel for historical retail
prices at launch.
2.3. Data from Other Webshops
Although Amazon and Steam are the most relevant
retail platforms for selling Kickstarter games and
technology products, many campaigns decide to sell
through other, more specialized webshops. To gather
pricing data from these pages, we trained four human
coders to assess all links provided by campaign
managers after the funding period in the campaign’s
header section to manually gather actual and, if
available, historical product prices for the exact prod-
uct sold in the Kickstarter campaign. In total, we
identiﬁed 1,548 campaigns that sold their products on
webshops other than Amazon and Steam. Each cam-
paign was assessed by two independent coders. A
Krippendorf’s Alpha of 0.819 indicates an acceptable
level of intercoder reliability. In case of disagree-
ments, a ﬁnal decision was made by a third coder.
2.4. Data from Consumer Protection Entities
(FBI, FTC, BBB, SEC, CFPB)
For information about ofﬁcial complaints ﬁled by
backers of Kickstarter campaigns, we gathered data
(requested directly or under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act) from the four most relevant consumer
protection entities in the United States: the FTC, the
BBB, the SEC, and the CFPB. In addition, we re-
quested data from the FBI’s Internet CrimeComplaint
Center for information on fraud related toKickstarter.
We received 4,432 pages of information, which we
manually matched with Kickstarter campaign data
using the names of campaigns and their campaign
managers. Matching revealed that ofﬁcial complaints
for 142 of 11,948 successfully ﬁnanced campaigns
(1.19%) were ﬁled with FBI, FTC, BBB, SEC, or CFPB.
2.5. Data from Campaign Managers and
Crowdfunding Experts
We conducted an online survey among 179 managers
of successfully funded Kickstarter campaigns, which
provided insight into campaign managers’ motiva-
tions for (not) offering PACs, into the effects of PACs
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on campaign operations, and into otherwise unob-
servable campaign characteristics. Moreover, we
surveyed 31 crowdfunding experts (academics and
practitioners) via structured, face-to-face interviews
about their expectations for PAC versus NoPAC
campaigns regarding savings, delivery, delay, and
product quality.
3. Measures of Interest and Their Links to
Price Advertising Claims (PACs)
3.1. Link Between PACs and Promised Savings and
Actual Savings
The focal measure of interest when investigating
consumer protection related to PACs is Promised
Savings. Current regulation clearly states that not
receiving (part of) the promised discount is consid-
ered an economic injury to consumers (for example,
Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., No. 11-55793). Throughout this
article, our use of the term economic injury strictly
refers to this well-established legal interpretation.
In line with this interpretation, we deﬁne Promised
Savings = Retail Price / Promised Price – 1, measuring
the percentage difference between the retail price
(found on Amazon, Steam, or other webshops)
and the retail price promised to consumers by the
Kickstarter campaign. If the promised price was $140,
but the retail price turnedout to be $59.99, thenPromised
Savings = $59.99/$140 – 1= –0.57. If Promised Sav-
ings takes on a negative value, the consumer did not
receive the promised discount and incurred eco-
nomic injury in the legal sense—we thus consider the
PAC promise broken. If Promised Savings ≥ 0, then
the Kickstarter campaign kept its PAC promise and
brought the product tomarket at the announced retail
price. By deﬁnition, NoPAC campaigns do not an-
nounce a retail price. We thus use the price paid on
Kickstarter instead of the promised price to calculate
Promised Savings for these campaigns.
In addition, we employ a second, more conserva-
tive measure for savings. We deﬁne Actual Savings =
Retail Price / Kickstarter Price – 1. Whereas Promised
Savings lets us see whether backers of PAC cam-
paigns on Kickstarter saved the promised amount, Ac-
tual Savings reveals whether backers on Kickstarter
saved any amount at all. If Retail Price is $59.99
and Kickstarter Price is $70, then Actual Savings =
$59.99 / $70 – 1 = –0.14. The negative valuemeans that
backers did not realize any savings over the retail
price by buying on Kickstarter.
3.2. Link Between PACs and Delivery, Delay,
Product Quality
Beyond Promised Savings and Actual Savings, we
investigate three additional metrics commonly dis-
cussed as campaign outcomes in the crowdfunding
literature (Belleﬂamme et al. 2014, Mollick 2014):
Delivery (whether the campaign delivers a product),
Delay (time difference between the announced and
the actual date of delivery for the product), and
Product Quality (consumer ratings for the product).
We do not have causal evidence of a link between PAC
usage and Delivery, Delay, or Product Quality. We
analyze the three metrics because of the suggestive
evidence presented below and leave it to future re-
search to investigate the causality of this link further.
It is a well-established notion in the entrepre-
neurship literature that ﬁnancial cushions improve
new venture performance, because greater cushions
allow ventures to absorb small mistakes and un-
expected costs more easily (Katz and Gartner 1988,
Chrisman et al. 1998). OnKickstarter, PAC campaigns
likely have smaller ﬁnancial cushions than their
NoPAC counterparts do. If a campaign decides to
include a PAC, the discount it provides to backers
reduces the gross margin and thus the ﬁnancial
cushion of the PAC campaign vis-a`-vis an otherwise
identical NoPAC campaign that does not offer a
discount.
For Kickstarter-speciﬁc insights on this topic, we sur-
veyed 179 Kickstarter campaignmanagers.1 Many (free-
form) comments by campaign managers support
the notion that PAC campaigns in particular lack a
ﬁnancial cushion. Campaign managers pinpointed
three speciﬁc consequences. First, campaigns might
fail to deliver anything because they cannot af-
ford to complete production. The managers stated,
“Discounts reduce the contribution margin,” “Costs
turned out to be higher,” and in consequence the
“Discounted price does not cover production costs.”
If campaigns lack a ﬁnancial cushion, they could
fail to deliver the product altogether. Second, if
campaigns do deliver, they might take longer be-
causemanagers needed to identifyways to save costs:
“Switching to overseas production” and “We had to
switch suppliers in order to avoid a massive loss”
are common comments that link a lack of ﬁnancial
cushion to delays. Finally, reduced margins might
force campaigns to compromise on quality. “You
can’t produce high quality at low costs,” onemanager
stated. One openly admitted, “We had to cut cor-
ners”; other managers reported using lower-quality
materials or cheaper, lower-quality partners for
production.
Suggestive evidence in the entrepreneurship liter-
ature and from interviews with Kickstarter campaign
managers about a potential effect of PAC usage
on Delivery, Delay, and Product Quality lead us to
include these measures in our empirical study on
consumer protection. Still, we focus on Promised
Savings as our focal measure.
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3.3. Terminology: Damage and Economic Injury
In the empirical analyses, we compare PAC and
NoPAC campaigns on Kickstarter. The comparison of
PAC versus NoPAC campaigns does not allow us to
make statements about the absolute utility backers
derive from supporting Kickstarter campaigns vis-
a`-vis outside options, such as preorders on Amazon
or nonpurchase. It does, however, allow us to com-
pare the relative beneﬁt backers of (unregulated) PAC
campaigns derived vis-a`-vis Kickstarter backers of
NoPAC campaigns. Throughout this article, we use
the term damage to describe relative differences in
Promised Savings and Actual Savings, Delivery, Delay,
and Product Quality between PAC and NoPAC cam-
paigns. Whenever we subsequently report damage
experienced by PAC backers, we thus refer to relative
damage in comparison with NoPAC backers.
In contrast, economic injury captures not relative but
absolute injury as deﬁned by regulators and enforced
by courts. We strictly use the term in its legal sense
with Economic Injury = Promised Price – Retail Price
(Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corporation, No. 11-55793).
4. Identiﬁcation
The assignment of campaigns to the PAC versus
NoPAC conditions is not random. As campaign man-
agers make the decision to (not) use PACs before
the start of the campaign, we expect that the as-
signment of PAC versus NoPAC systematically re-
lates to precampaign characteristics. To help identify
the effect of PACs in our study, we therefore employ
propensity score matching (PSM) based on observ-
able precampaign characteristics. This technique has
been widely used in marketing (Gensler et al. 2012)
to control for potential endogeneity resulting from
the nonrandom assignment of treatments. Propensity
scores are calculated as the predicted probability
that a campaign uses PACs given its observable and
statistically signiﬁcant precampaign characteristics
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1984).
The key question in using PSM for identiﬁcation
is whether matching on observables captures all rele-
vant factors or whether potentially unobservable fac-
tors would alter the results. We will discuss both
questions below.
4.1. Observed Precampaign Characteristics
In matching PAC and NoPAC campaigns, we con-
sider 20 knowndrivers of campaigns’ funding success
derived from the extant literature. These 20 drivers
contain all known precampaign characteristics that
have been conﬁrmed to affect campaign success on
Kickstarter in three or more published studies. Com-
bined, they capture differences in campaign features,
campaign quality, team quality, and campaigns’ mar-
ket environment on launch. For our analyses, we test
whether these known drivers of campaign success
also affect PAC usage. As shown in Table 1, only 10 of
these drivers do, and we subsequently include them
in our analyses.
In addition to the 20 knowndrivers in the literature,
we tested another 7 potential drivers, 3 of which in-
deed affect PAC usage. For example, we observe that
if a campaign is started around a major holiday or
sales event (where campaign managers encounter
more PACs in the environment), the campaign is
more likely to use PACs. In contrast, competition at
campaign launch, campaign risk, or innovativeness
do not affect PAC usage. We summarize all 27 pre-
campaign characteristics in Table 1 and use all sig-
niﬁcant drivers of PAC usage in the analyses going
forward.
4.2. Unobserved Precampaign Characteristics
The list of 27 potential drivers of PAC usage covers
campaign features (e.g., campaign goal, subcategory),
campaign quality (e.g., header and body videos, en-
dorsements, innovativeness), team quality (e.g., cam-
paigns launched, credibility, incorporated ﬁrm) and
market environment (e.g., location, competition, sales
week). Still, other unobservable confounds might exist
that could bias our results. Most prominently, these
might relate to expected product quality, team quality
(self-assessed team quality, ability to deliver, deliver
on time), and ﬁnancing characteristics (availability
of alternative funding options, likelihood to reach
funding goal). To address these points and better
understand the data-generating process, we conduct-
ed a survey of 179 managers of successfully funded
Kickstarter campaigns. Of these, 93 used PACs in their
campaign and 86 did not.
As detailed in Table 2, we asked campaign man-
agers about product and team quality, as well as
ﬁnancing characteristics to uncover potential unob-
served differences between PAC and NoPAC cam-
paigns. Survey results provided no indication that
PAC and NoPAC campaigns differ signiﬁcantly
along these dimensions in the prelaunch phase. To
minimize adverse effects from potential social de-
sirability bias, we designed the survey so that cam-
paign managers were unaware about the study’s
focus on PACs when they answered the questions in
Table 2.
Moreover, we asked campaign managers about
their decision to (not) use PACs in a free-form question.
Of these managers, 45% (40 PAC managers and
41 NoPAC managers) did not provide any reason,
and another 23% (23 PAC managers and 18 NoPAC
managers) considered their choice for or against
PACs as the norm (“Common practice on Kickstar-
ter,” or “It’s not permitted by Kickstarter”). Only
about one-third of all surveyed campaign managers
Blaseg, Schulze, and Skiera: Consumer Protection on Kickstarter
216 Marketing Science, 2020, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 211–233, © 2020 The Author(s)
Table 1. 27 Observable Precampaign Characteristics Tested to Affect Usage of Price Advertising Claims in Kickstarter
Campaigns in a Logistic Regression
Observable precampaign
characteristic Description Source
Found to affect
PAC usage
Known drivers of campaign success
Campaign features Reward count Total number of different reward types
offered
Courtney et al. (2017) 3
Campaign features Campaign goal
(USD)
Natural logarithm of fundraising goal
amount (USD)
Mollick (2014) 3
Campaign features Subcategory Dummy variables capturing all available
subcategories on Kickstarter
Mollick (2014) 3
Campaign quality Header video Dummy variable (1 if campaign has an
explanatory video, 0 otherwise)
Mollick (2014) 3
Campaign quality Body video count Number of embedded videos in full
body description
Colombo et al. (2015) 3
Campaign quality Body length (000) Number of words in full body
description
Parhankangas and Renko
(2017)
3
Campaign quality Endorsements Dummy variable (1 for campaigns that
were endorsed by tech and games
websites, 0 otherwise)
Calic and Mosakowski
(2016)
3
Team quality Campaigns
launched
Number of previous technology and
games campaigns on Kickstarter
started by the campaign manager
Parhankangas and Renko
(2017)
3
Team quality Credibility Dummy variable (1 if campaign includes
a link to own website, 0 otherwise)
Johnson et al. (2018) 3
Team quality Firm Dummy variable (1 if campaign is
initiated by a registered entity, 0
otherwise)
Steigenberger and Wilhelm
(2018)
3
Campaign features Price (USD) Price of “one standard product,
unlimited availability” reward (USD)
Hu et al. (2015)
Campaign features Duration Number of days for which a campaign
accepts funding
Mollick (2014)
Campaign quality Spelling mistakes Dummy variable (1 for campaigns that
include a spelling error in full body
description, 0 otherwise)
Mollick (2014)
Campaign quality Linguistic style Linguistic cues of full body description
(use of numerical terms, passion,
authenticity, readability)
Steigenberger and Wilhelm
(2018)
Team quality Work experience Number of work-related words in
biography
Allison et al. (2017)
Team quality Backer experience Campaign manager’s number of
previously backed campaigns (not
their own) on Kickstarter
Calic and Mosakowski
(2016)
Team quality Social capital Dummy variable (1 if campaign includes
a links to social media sites, 0
otherwise)
Greenberg and Mollick
(2017)
Team quality Ethnicity Ethnicity based on disclosed name of
campaign manager
Younkin and Kuppuswamy
(2017)
Team quality Gender Dummy variable (1 if campaign is
initiated by a woman, 0 otherwise)
Johnson et al. (2018)
Market environment Location Country codes according to the United
Nations geoscheme
Agrawal et al. (2015)
Additional characteristics
Campaign features Delivery time Difference between end of campaign and
announced delivery in days
Own analysis 3
Campaign quality Worldwide
shipping
Dummy variable (1 if campaign offered
worldwide shipping, 0 otherwise)
Own analysis 3
Market environment Sales week Dummy variable (1 for campaigns
started during a sales week, 0
otherwise)
Own analysis 3
Campaign quality Innovativeness Textual analysis (scaled 0–1) of
campaign descriptions regarding
innovation topics
Bellstam, Bhagat, and
Cookson (2017)
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noted that their choice for or against PAC usage was
a deliberate decision. Nineteen percent (19 PAC man-
agers and 15 NoPAC managers) stated that con-
siderations of demand and proﬁtability drove
their decision (“To attract more backers,” but also
“Kickstarter is for early adopters. They are not price
sensitive”). The remaining 13% (11 PAC managers
and 12 NoPAC managers) provided other reasons,
such as concerns about complexity. None of the an-
swers pointed toward additional relevant drivers that
are not included in our analyses already.
4.3. Potential Bias from Omitted Variables
The list of observed, considered precampaign char-
acteristics is extensive, and differences between PAC
and NoPAC campaigns along these dimensions are
small and nonsystematic. In particular, we do not see
any indication that PAC campaigns are systemati-
cally inferior to NoPAC campaigns, which could
support the idea of “PAC usage as a last resort.”
Moreover, the existence of major differences in un-
observed product quality, team quality, or ﬁnancing
characteristics is unlikely, given the answers of 179
campaign managers. Campaign managers’ free-form
answers also did not point toward additional relevant
drivers. Still, it is possible that we do not completely
address self-selection and that omitted variables bias
our results. We thus investigate the robustness of our
results to potential omitted variable bias following
three slightly different approaches by Altonji et al.
(2005), Gonza´lez andMiguel (2015), and Oster (2019).
Oster’s (2019) approach to assess potential omitted
variable bias is in essence an extension of the pro-
cedure of Altonji et al. (2005) to consider (a) the var-
iation of the estimated coefﬁcient of interest (e.g.,
PAC campaign) through the inclusion of additional
covariates, as well as (b) the associated shift in R2 to
assess how sensitive results are to potentially omitted
variables (see Oster (2019) for details and a formal
derivation). The key assumption of the approach is
that the selection on observable variables is infor-
mative about the selection on unobservable ones.
Following this approach, we calculate an estimate
of the bias-adjusted treatment effect of using PACs on
our main dependent variable of interest, Promised
Savings (as detailed in Section 3.1). In Table 3, we
report the coefﬁcient for PAC campaign β without
any controls (column (1)) and with all precampaign
characteristics as control variables (column (2)).2 In
column (3), we report an identiﬁed set of parameters
on the treatment effect, bounded on one side by the
controlled treatment effect β˜ and on the other by the
bias-adjusted effect β*′ with δ = 1 and Rmax  1.3R˜, as
proposed by Oster (2019). The identiﬁed set excludes
zero and the bounds of the identiﬁed set arewithin the
conﬁdence interval of β˜, suggesting that the results
Table 1. (Continued)
Observable precampaign
characteristic Description Source
Found to affect
PAC usage
Campaign quality Risk index Index (scaled 1–9) of 9 input factors
reﬂecting project complexity,
information, creator characteristics
Madsen and McMullin
(2018)
Campaign quality Risk section word
count
Number of words in risk section Own analysis
Market environment Competition Number of concurrent campaigns on
Kickstarter
Own analysis
Table 2. Results of Survey of 179 Kickstarter Campaign Managers Regarding Their Assessment of Own Campaign’s Product
Quality, Team Quality, and Financing Options Before Campaign Start
Unobservable precampaign characteristic PAC (n = 93) NoPAC (n = 86) Difference Scale
Product quality
Expected quality ofmain product before campaign start 5.39 5.31 −0.07n.s. 1 (very low) to 7 (very high)
Team quality
Self-assessed quality of team behind campaign 5.47 5.34 −0.14n.s. 1 (very weak) to 7 (very strong)
Conﬁdence in delivering main product to backers 5.05 5.01 −0.04n.s. 1 (not conﬁdent) to 7 (very conﬁdent)
Conﬁdence in keeping promised delivery date (rather
than deliver late)
3.75 3.81 0.06n.s. 1 (not conﬁdent) to 7 (very conﬁdent)
Financing
Conﬁdence in reaching funding goal 5.25 5.38 0.14n.s. 1 (not conﬁdent) to 7 (very conﬁdent)
Conﬁdence in obtaining funding from other sources
in case of not reaching funding goal
4.01 4.31 0.30n.s. 1 (not conﬁdent) to 7 (very conﬁdent)
n.s.p ≥ 0.10; *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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from our controlled regressions are robust to omitted
variable bias.
The calculation of β*′ is very sensitive to reasonable
choices of the maximum R2. We thus assess the ro-
bustness of our analysis using a more conservative
value of Rmax  0.5 (Gonza´lez and Miguel 2015). The
identiﬁed set in column (4) again excludes zero.
Finally, we calculate the ratio δ (i.e., the degree of
proportionality) of the impact of unobserved vari-
ables relative to the observed explanatory variables.
The degree of proportionality δ indicates how much
stronger selection on unobservables (versus selection
on observables) has to be for the coefﬁcient of PAC
campaign β to equal 0 (Altonji et al. 2005). The value of
the δ ratio (column (5)) is well in line with values
considered robust in the literature (Manchanda et al.
2015, Krauth 2016) and indicates that any unobserved
campaign characteristics would need to be 2.442
times as relevant as all the observed characteristics
combined to nullify our results (Altonji et al. 2005). In
summary, results from all three analyses consistently
suggest that our ﬁndings are unlikely to be driven by
omitted variables.
4.4. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Procedure
In the subsequent PSM analyses, we apply nearest
neighbor matching with caliper, which is preferred
when analyzing large samples of untreated obser-
vations (NoPAC) relative to the treated group (PAC)
(Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). The method matches
each PAC campaign with the NoPAC campaign that
has the closest propensity score (Rosenbaum and
Rubin 1984). The use of caliper width increases the
quality of matching by ensuring that matching occurs
only when the absolute difference between the pro-
pensity scores of two potentially matched campaigns
is reasonably small and less than a predeﬁned caliper
distance (ε). In line with the literature, we deﬁne the
caliper distance as the proportion of the standard
deviation of the propensity score (σP), calculated as
ε  0.25σP (Guo and Fraser 2014). Results are stable to
the use of kernelmatching as an alternative technique.
Although campaigns show signiﬁcant differences
in precampaign characteristics before use of the PSM
procedure, the Hotelling test of equal vector means
reveals no signiﬁcant differences between PAC and
NoPAC groups after PSM, indicating successful match-
ing (Cao and Sorescu 2013). We provide details on
PSM andHotelling test results in the online appendix.
5. Results of the Empirical Study
To investigate whether consumer protection “hap-
pened automatically” in the observed six-year period
during which PAC regulation was not applied to
Kickstarter or whether there is a substantial, persistent,
and unresolved problem with broken PAC promises
onKickstarter, we investigate ﬁve questions: (1) Is there
a substantial problem with broken PAC promises
on Kickstarter? (2) Do consumers care? (3) Did con-
sumers learn to avoid the problem? (4) Did campaign
managers take measures that solved the problem?
(5) Did Kickstarter take measures that solved the
problem?Wesubsequentlypresent ouranalyses,model-
free evidence, and results regarding each question.
5.1. Is There a Substantial Problem with Broken
PAC Promises on Kickstarter?
5.1.1. Analyses. Our analyses of potentially broken
PAC promises focus on Promised Savings as the key
measure, which allows us to reliably quantify eco-
nomic injury. This measure is aligned with current
regulation, by which not receiving the full prom-
ised discount is considered an injury to consumers
(Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corporation, No. 11-55793). In addi-
tion, we report Actual Savings as a second, more
conservative measure for savings. Both Promised
Savings and Actual Savings directly link to PACs (see
Section 3.1 for details).
In addition, we report Delivery, Delay, and Product
Quality. As noted in Section 3.2, all three measures
are potential indirect sources of damage to backers
Table 3. Assessment of Potential Omitted Variable Bias Following Oster (2019), Gonza´les and Miguel (2015), and Altonji,
Elder, and Taber (2005)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline effect
β˙, (SE), [R˙]
Controlled effect
β˜, (SE), [R˜]
Identiﬁed set
[β˜, β*′ (min{1.3R˜, 1}, 1)]
Identiﬁed set
[Rmax = 0.5] δ for β = 0
PAC campaign −0.374*** −0.396*** [–0.436, –0.396] [–1.771, –0.396] 2.442
(0.023) [0.123] (0.025) [0.161]
Robust toward
omitted variable bias
3 3 3
Reference Oster (2019) Gonza´les and Miguel
(2015)
Altonji, Elder, and
Taber (2005)
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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that are commonly discussed in the crowdfunding
literature (Belleﬂamme et al. 2014, Mollick 2014). We
deﬁne Delivery = 1 if product has been delivered and 0
otherwise. Among both PAC and NoPAC campaigns,
failure to deliver a product is not unusual. We are,
however, interested inwhether the likelihood of delivery
is lower for PAC campaigns versus NoPAC campaigns.
To identify whether a campaign delivered (labeled
as known positive) or has announced failure to de-
liver (known negative), we use text mining on three
sources: (1) campaign updates posted on Kickstarter,
(2) information from Kickscammed, a public web-
site where users can report crowdfunding cam-
paigns they consider to be scams, and (3) articles on
CrunchBase, which provides 18,488 news articles
relating to Kickstarter from websites such as Tech-
Crunch, Wired, CNet and Gizmodo. We match in-
formation from Kickscammed and CrunchBase to the
respective campaigns using the campaign names.
For the classiﬁcation,we seek to extract information
about whether the campaign has started to ship the
promised rewards (e.g., “Shipped,” or “Delivery
started”) or has announced failure (e.g., “We failed,”
or “We stopped work”). If information on successful
delivery is available, we deﬁne this campaign as
delivered (Delivery = 1). To circumvent false an-
nouncements, we also require at least one backer to
conﬁrm the receipt of the product in the comments. If
information on failure is available, we deﬁne these
campaigns as not delivered (Delivery = 0). If a cam-
paign has not conﬁrmed delivery and has not an-
nounced failure to deliver, we classify the campaign
as not delivered yet.
Further, we operationalize Delay = min(Actual De-
livery Date – Announced Delivery Date; 0), where de-
livery delays are measured in days, and early and
punctual deliveries are coded as 0. We calculate the
delay as the difference between the announced de-
livery date and the actual date of the shipping an-
nouncement (only for campaigns with Delivery = 1).
As campaign managers announce shipping dates in a
month-year format, we calculate delay based on the
last day of the month and regard shipping within the
announced month as on time (i.e., Delay = 0).
We base our measure of Product Quality on re-
views from consumers outside the Kickstarter plat-
form. Amazon enables consumers to submit reviews
in text form and ratings of products in the form of
numerical star ratings (ranging from one to ﬁve stars),
whereas Steam allows users to submit text reviews
and a thumbs-up or thumbs-down recommendation.
Average ratings for a product are the average of the
number of stars on Amazon and the share of positive
recommendations on Steam. We make the rating
systems comparable by rescaling the Amazon ratings
to a percentage value (= (Average Star Rating – 1)/4).
We then compare the ratings from PAC and NoPAC
campaigns.3
The number of observations naturally differs among
these ﬁve metrics (Figure 2). We are able to observe
Promised Savings and Actual Savings for a total of
1,9094 campaigns (390 PAC campaigns, 20.43%). We
observe Product Quality for a total of 361 campaigns
(78 PAC campaigns, 21.61%), where the product
is sold on either Amazon or Steam on successful
completion of the Kickstarter campaign. We observe
Figure 2. Overview of Number of Available Observations for Analyses of Savings, Delivery, Delay, Product Quality,
Complaints, and Sentiment (in Bold Boxes)
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Delivery for 8,673 campaigns, which either delivered
(8,385 campaigns, 96.68%) or ofﬁcially failed to do so
(288 campaigns, 3.32%).5 We observe Delay for all
8,385 campaigns that delivered.
The following analyses compare PAC campaigns
against NoPAC campaigns, rather than against
an ideal benchmark. The reason is that Kickstarter
backers cannot expect the same experience as buyers
in an online store. For example, Mollick (2014) has
shown that backers should expect delivery delays
when funding campaigns on Kickstarter. Because
comparing PAC campaigns’ Delay against an ideal
benchmark of Delay = 0 would be misleading, we use
comparable Kickstarter campaigns that do not use
PACs (NoPAC) as a more conservative benchmark.
5.1.2. Model-Free Evidence. Model-free evidence on
Promised Savings and Actual Savings (Figure 3) re-
veals that PAC campaigns not only fail to deliver the
promised discount in 75.9% of all cases (blue bars to
the left of the dotted line, left histogram); in 47.2% of
all cases, they even fail to deliver any savings at all.
In comparison, NoPAC campaigns (which by deﬁni-
tion do not promise a discount) provide a significantly
larger de facto discount to backers on Kickstarter,
who pay lower prices than online retail consumers
(see Table 4).
In Table 4, we report model-free evidence for all
ﬁve measures as they differ between NoPAC and
PAC campaigns. We observe a signiﬁcant differ-
ence between PAC and NoPAC campaigns across
all measures. Promised Savings and Actual Sav-
ings are lower, Delivery likelihood is lower, Delay is
longer, and Product Quality is lower for PAC (versus
NoPAC) campaigns.
5.1.3. Results. After successful application of PSM
(see the online appendix for details), we compare
PAC and NoPAC campaigns via a simple t-test for
Promised Savings and Actual Savings, Delay, and
Product Quality, as well as via χ2-test for Delivery.
Results for all ﬁve measures in this causal analysis
conﬁrm the model-free evidence: PAC campaigns
have lower savings (promised and actual), lower
likelihood of ever delivering the product, and longer
delays and lower product quality in case of delivery
compared with their NoPAC counterparts (Table 5).
The size of the effects is comparable to the model-free
evidence.
5.2. Do Consumers Care?
5.2.1. Analyses. Crowdfunding research typically as-
sumes that backers are maximizing their personal
(ﬁnancial) surplus (Hu et al. 2015) and are motivated
to support campaigns on Kickstarter because of at-
tractive (and attractively priced) rewards (Cholakova
and Clarysse 2015). However, backers might also
engage in crowdfunding because the process itself
provides them with additional utility (e.g., bring-
ing the product to life) over buying via traditional
retail (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017b, Bitterl and
Schreier 2018).
If backers gain a lot of utility from bringing the
product to life, then the objectively measurable dam-
age they incur from PAC (versus NoPAC) campaigns
shown in Section 5.1 might not be relevant to them.
To establish whether consumers care, we analyze
whether backers, in particular PAC backers, react
negatively when experiencing damage regarding
Promised Savings and Actual Savings, Delivery,
Delay, and Product Quality ﬁrsthand. To this end, we
Figure 3. (Color online) Distribution of Promised and Actual Savings for Campaigns Using Price Advertising Claims (PACs)
Note. Blue bars to the left of the dotted line = unfavorable outcome for the backer.
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compare PAC backers that differ regarding the out-
come of their ﬁrst PAC campaign.6 For the analysis of
Promised Savings, for example, we compare backers
whose ﬁrst PAC campaign honored the promised
price (no damage) against backers whose ﬁrst PAC
campaign did not and sold the product for less than
the promised price at online retailers (damage). If
backers care about the ﬁve metrics we analyze, then
experiencing damage ﬁrsthand in any of these di-
mensions should result in a drop in funding likeli-
hood for future Kickstarter campaigns compared
with backers that experienced no damage in that
dimension. Our composition of the no-damage con-
trol group is conservative, as backers in that group
may have experienced other damages that reduce
their likelihood to invest in another Kickstarter cam-
paign in the future.
We base our analyses in this section on the com-
plete backing histories of 442,185 backers—a sizeable
subset7 of all backers in Kickstarter’s games and
technology categories—and employ PSM to ﬁnd com-
parable backers8 that did versus did not experi-
ence damage along each of the ﬁve measures on their
ﬁrst PAC campaign.
Moreover, we investigate whether the damage ex-
perienced by backers of PAC campaigns (with backers
of NoPAC campaigns as a reference group) is out-
weighed by countervailing beneﬁts to these backers.
If backers experience (unobserved) additional bene-
ﬁts from supporting campaigns using PACs that
are not prevalent in NoPAC campaigns and that
outweigh the damage experienced by PAC backers
that we documented previously, we should observe
that backers’ sentiment for PAC campaigns is more
positive than or identical to backers’ sentiment for
NoPAC campaigns. Also, we should expect a lower or
identical likelihood of ofﬁcial complaints for PAC
versus NoPAC campaigns.
We analyze backer sentiment through backers’
comments posted on the campaign website after the
end of the funding period. Of 11,948 successfully ﬁ-
nanced campaigns, 10,818 campaigns (90.54%) re-
ceived at least one comment. The average number of
comments per campaign is 396. We automatically
analyzed these comments using Linguistic Inquiry
and Word Count (LIWC). Using word counts for a
given text, LIWC calculates the proportion of words
thatmatch predeﬁned dictionaries for different types,
such as positive and negative words. As one of the
most popular tools used in social science research to
measure emotional expression, the LIWC approach
has been applied to a broad range of text cate-
gories, including crowdfunding campaign descrip-
tions (Younkin and Kuppuswamy 2017). We base
our analysis on the LIWC standardized summary
variable of emotional tone, which combines positive
and negative sentiment in a single variable scaled
from0 to 1, such that numbers greater than 0.5 suggest
a predominantly positive sentiment. We then com-
pare the average sentiment from PAC and NoPAC
campaigns.9
We further deﬁne Complaint = 1 if a campaign has
received ofﬁcial ﬁling of a consumer complaint (with
either FBI, FTC, BBB, SEC, or CFPB) and 0 otherwise.
Table 5. Results of T- and χ2-Tests Analyzing Differences in Damage to Backers Between Campaigns Using Price Advertising
Claims (PAC) vs. Campaigns Not Using Price Advertising Claims (NoPAC) after Successful Propensity Score Matching
After PSM PAC campaigns NoPAC campaigns Difference in means Observations
Campaigns with less beneﬁcial
outcome for consumers
Promised Savings −0.205 0.176 −0.381*** 754 PAC
Actual Savings 0.048 0.176 −0.127*** 754 PAC
Delivery 0.947 0.972 −0.025*** 2,850 PAC
Delay 99.846 84.330 15.516*** 2,702 PAC
Product Quality 0.735 0.802 −0.067** 132 PAC
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table 4. Model-Free Evidence on Damage to Backers of Campaigns Using Price Advertising Claims (PAC) vs. Campaigns Not
Using Price Advertising Claims (NoPAC)
Model-free PAC campaigns NoPAC campaigns Difference in means Observations
Campaigns with less beneﬁcial
outcome for consumers
Promised Savings −0.207 0.168 −0.374*** 1,909 PAC
Actual Savings 0.049 0.168 −0.119*** 1,909 PAC
Delivery 0.948 0.971 −0.023*** 8,673 PAC
Delay 99.227 83.076 16.151*** 8,385 PAC
Product Quality 0.709 0.806 −0.097*** 361 PAC
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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We match 4,432 pages of complaints with all 11,948
successfullyﬁnanced campaigns in our dataset byusing
names of campaigns and their campaign managers.
5.2.2. Model-Free Evidence. Table 6 shows that backers
who experience damage10 in their ﬁrst PAC cam-
paign see a (statistically signiﬁcant) lower likelihood
of ever funding another Kickstarter campaign in
the games or technology categories when compared
against backers who do not experience the same
kind of damage.
In Table 7, we further report model-free evidence
comparingbackers’ beneﬁts between PACandNoPAC
campaigns. Model-free evidence suggests that backers
of PAC campaigns show signiﬁcantly lower aver-
age sentiment scores (i.e., are more negative in their
comments) than backers of NoPAC campaigns.
Complaint rates mirror this ﬁnding. In total, we
record at least one complaint for 94 NoPAC (0.93%
of 10.160 funded NoPAC) and 48 PAC (2.68% of
1.788 funded PAC) campaigns. The likelihood of
a PAC campaign backer ﬁling an ofﬁcial complaint
is thus substantially greater than for backers of
NoPAC campaigns. Notably, we observe no com-
plaints (0.00%) among the 94 PAC campaigns that
kept their PAC promises. The relatively low share of
campaigns with complaints overall reﬂects the sub-
stantial effort that is required to ﬁle such an ofﬁcial
complaint (Raval 2016).
5.2.3. Results. Results after successful matching of
PAC backers who do (versus do not) experience
damage in their ﬁrst PAC campaign conﬁrm the
model-free evidence. In Table 8 we see that damage
regarding Promised Savings and Actual Savings,
Delivery, Delay, and Product Quality matters to PAC
backers. If they experience damage in the respec-
tive dimensions, their likelihood of funding another
Kickstarter campaign in the games or technology
categories drops by up to 90.65%.
We then compare the matched PAC and NoPAC
campaigns regarding backer sentiment (t-test) and
complaint likelihood (χ2 test). Results shown in Table 9
mirror the model-free evidence: backers in PAC cam-
paigns show signiﬁcantly more negative sentiment
in their comments on the campaign websites and are
50% more likely to ﬁle an ofﬁcial complaint (mean for
PAC campaigns is 0.027;mean forNoPAC campaigns is
0.018 after matching).
5.3. Did Consumers Learn to Avoid the Problem?
5.3.1. Analyses. Literature arguing against the ex-
plicit regulation of PACs contends that skeptical
consumers will learn to discount PACs and thus
protect themselves from deception (Urbany et al.
1988, Biswas and Blair 1991, Kaufmann et al. 1994).
In markets with high transparency (such as Kickstarter,
where all historic transactions and backer comments
are public), consumers might learn from past be-
havior (their own and others’) and adapt their be-
havior and attitudes (Dellarocas 2003). As shown
in Section 5.2, damaged consumers learn to avoid
Kickstarter campaigns in general—the crucial ques-
tion is, however, whether they learn to avoid PAC
campaigns speciﬁcally.
In the following, we distinguish PAC-speciﬁc learn-
ing on three different levels: population (i.e., all
consumers learn), subpopulation (i.e., groups such
Table 6. Model-Free Evidence on Reductions in Funding Likelihood for Another
Kickstarter Campaign Among Backers That Experienced Damage vs. No Damage
in Their First PAC Campaign
Model-free
Drop in funding likelihood
for another campaign Observations
Promised Savings −4.4%*** 182,821
Actual Savings −12.2%*** 191,317
Delivery −91.3%*** 408,571
Delay −6.7%*** 399,778
Product Quality −29.3%*** 87,577
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table 7. Model-Free Evidence on Backer Sentiment and Likelihood of Ofﬁcial Complaints for Campaigns Using
Price Advertising Claims (PAC) vs. Campaigns Not Using Price Advertising Claims (NoPAC)
Model-free PAC campaigns NoPAC campaigns Difference in means Observations
Campaigns with less beneﬁcial
outcome for consumers
Sentiment 0.557 0.598 −0.041*** 10,818 PAC
Complaint 0.027 0.009 0.018*** 11,948 PAC
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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as the more knowledgeable consumers learn), and
individual (i.e., consumers that experienced damage
ﬁrsthand learn).
• On the population level, PAC-speciﬁc learning
across all consumers (new and experienced) should
be evident in a reduced funding likelihood for PAC
campaigns as time progresses because they provide
less consumer beneﬁt than NoPAC campaigns.
• On the subpopulation level, we should see more
experienced “crowdfunding experts” expecting greater
damage from PAC (versus NoPAC) campaigns.
• For individual-level learning, we should see dam-
aged (versus nondamaged) PAC campaign backers to
showadecrease in the likelihoodof fundinganother PAC
campaign that is larger than the decrease in likelihood
of funding another campaign on Kickstarter in general.
For the population-level analysis, we look for a
reduction in funding likelihood for PAC campaigns
over time. This reduction could be either an abso-
lute reduction in funding likelihood for more recent
versus older PAC campaigns (a conservativemeasure
for learning: consumers learn that PAC campaigns
are not as good as originally anticipated) or a rela-
tive reduction in funding likelihood for recent PAC
campaigns compared with recent NoPAC campaigns
(where consumers learn that PAC campaigns are less
attractive than NoPAC campaigns, akin to a diff-in-
diff logic).
In the analysis, we deﬁne Recent Campaign = 1 if the
campaign started between April and September 2016
and 0 if the campaign started in the same time frame in
the year before (April to September 2015). Although
learning about the economic injury associatedwithPAC
campaigns should occur on a continuous basis given a
constant streamof newPAC campaigns,we choseApril
2016 as a turning point in our analysis, because it marks
the timewhen the Kickstarter campaign Coolest Cooler
failed.CoolestCooler raisedmore than $13million from
more than 60,000 backers in 2014, making it one of the
most prominent Kickstarter campaigns ever.When the
campaign announced it would not deliver a product
in April 2016, media coverage was tremendous.
Coolest Cooler was a PAC campaign, promising a
38% discount over the retail price. We expect that the
highly publicized failure of this PAC campaign added
to consumer learning.
To assess population-level learning, we ﬁrst com-
pare the funding likelihood of more recent PAC
campaigns with the funding likelihood of older PAC
campaigns. Second, we compare the change in fund-
ing likelihood for recent versus older PAC campaigns
against the change in funding likelihood for recent
versus older NoPAC campaigns.
For the subpopulation-level learning analysis, we
surveyed 31 crowdfunding experts (academics and
practitioners attending a crowdfunding conference in
2016, each of whom backed on average 6.72 campaigns)
via structured, face-to-face interviews. Speciﬁcally,
we were interested in their expectations for PAC
versus NoPAC campaigns regarding savings, de-
livery, delay, and product quality. We collected their
answers on a seven-point Likert scale, such that
smaller (greater) numbers signiﬁed worse (superior)
performance of PAC versus NoPAC campaigns. The
scale midpoint, 4, thus signiﬁed equal expected
performance.
Table 8. Reductions in Funding Likelihood for Another Kickstarter Campaign Among Backers That Experienced Damage vs.
No Damage in Their First PAC Campaign; Results After Successful Propensity Score Matching
After PSM Promised savings Actual savings Delivery Delay Product quality
Likelihood of funding another campaign
Outcome of ﬁrst PAC campaign
No damage 0.529 0.528 0.520 0.589 0.660
Damage 0.458 0.475 0.049 0.485 0.507
Drop in funding likelihood –13.43%*** –10.06%*** –90.65%*** –17.69%*** –23.15%***
Number of observations 68,400 155,684 17,644 181,210 51,716
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table 9. Results of T- and χ2-Tests Analyzing Differences in Backer Sentiment and Likelihood of Ofﬁcial Complaints Between
Campaigns Using Price Advertising Claims (PAC) vs. Campaigns Not Using Price Advertising Claims (NoPAC)
After PSM PAC campaigns NoPAC campaigns Difference in means Observations
Campaigns with less beneﬁcial
outcome for consumers
Sentiment 0.557 0.586 −0.028*** 3,372 PAC
Complaint likelihood 0.027 0.018 0.009* 3,546 PAC
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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For the individual-level learning analysis, we ex-
tended the analysis presented in Table 8 to include the
funding likelihood for future PAC campaigns. For
individual-level learning about PACs to occur, the
drop in funding likelihood for future PAC campaigns
between the two groups (damage versus no damage)
needs to be larger than the drop in funding likelihood
for future Kickstarter campaigns in general.
Regulators typically step in unless there is population-
level learning, in order to make sure that all con-
sumers are protected (which is not the case with
subpopulation-level learning) and to make sure
that consumers are protected before they themselves
experience damage (which is not the case if only
individual-level learning is prevalent) (Financial
Conduct Authority 2017). Still, we subsequently in-
vestigate all three levels.
5.3.2. Model-Free Evidence. In Table 10 we report
model-free evidence for the funding likelihood of
recent and older PAC and NoPAC campaigns. The
results show an increase in funding likelihood of
PAC campaigns over time, which indicates a lack of
PAC-speciﬁc consumer learning on the population level.
While the increase in funding likelihood for PAC cam-
paigns (0.511 – 0.490 = 0.021) is slightly larger than for
NoPAC campaigns (0.306 – 0.295 = 0.012) in the same
period, neither of the increases is statistically signiﬁcant.
As previously reported in Table 6, backers whose
ﬁrst PACcampaign causeddamage are less likely to fund
another Kickstarter campaign compared with backers
whose ﬁrst campaign caused no damage—indicating
that backers care about the damage they experienced
ﬁrsthand. In Table 11, we present model-free evi-
dence that compares the drops in funding likelihood
for Kickstarter campaigns in general versus for PAC
campaigns. The drop in funding likelihood for another
PAC campaign is never larger than the drop in funding
likelihood for Kickstarter campaigns in general. We thus
have no indication of PAC-speciﬁc individual-level
learning from the model-free evidence.
5.3.3. Results. For the population-level analysis, we
ﬁrst compare recent and older PAC campaigns after
successful PSM. The probit regression in Table 12
shows that funding likelihood for these campaigns
increases over time (positive coefﬁcient for recent
campaigns), offering no indication of PAC-speciﬁc
consumer learning from this analysis.11
To compare the relative increase in funding like-
lihood for PAC campaigns over time with those of
NoPAC campaigns, we ﬁrst apply PSM and then
follow the format of a diff-in-diff analysis. Please note
that we do not claim that NoPAC campaigns are a
perfect control group (after all, the failure of Coolest
Cooler may have affected the funding likelihood of
NoPAC campaigns as well). Results of the analysis
conﬁrm the model-free evidence: the difference in
funding likelihood of PAC versus NoPAC campaigns
is not signiﬁcant. If anything, the average funding
likelihood of matched PAC campaigns has seen a
faster increase (Table 13), which would contradict
learning about PACs.We thus cannot observe signs of
PAC-speciﬁc population-level consumer learning in
these analyses.
For the subpopulation-level analysis, we surveyed
31 crowdfunding experts as detailed in Table 14.
In line with our previous analyses, we do not ﬁnd
evidence of PAC-speciﬁc consumer learning, not
even among crowdfunding experts. Experts expect
Table 10. Model-Free Evidence on Average Funding Likelihood for Recent (April to September 2016) vs. Older (April to
September 2015) Campaigns Using Price Advertising Claims (PAC) vs. Not Using Price Advertising Claims (NoPAC)
Model-free
PAC campaigns NoPAC campaigns
ObservationsOlder campaigns Recent campaigns Older campaigns Recent campaigns
Funding likelihood 0.490 0.511 0.295 0.306 8,215
Table 11. Model-Free Evidence on Reductions in Funding Likelihood for Another Kickstarter Campaign in General vs.
Another PAC Campaign Among Backers That Experienced Damage in Their First PAC Campaign
Model-free
Drop in funding likelihood for
PAC-speciﬁc consumer learning? ObservationsAnother campaign Another PAC campaign
Promised Savings −4.4% −0.4% No 182,821
Actual Savings −12.2% −4.3% No 191,317
Delivery −91.3% −89.3% No 408,571
Delay −6.7% 3.8% No 399,778
Product Quality −29.3% −11.9% No 87,577
Note. PAC-speciﬁc consumer learningwould require the drop in funding likelihood for “Another PAC campaign” to be signiﬁcantly larger than
the drop in funding likelihood for “Another campaign.”
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PAC campaigns to offer greater savings and de-
livery likelihood. They do not expect differences
in delay or product quality between PAC and
NoPAC campaigns.
Finally, we analyze individual-level learning. Results
after PSM conﬁrm themodel-free evidence. Backerswho
experienced damage in their ﬁrst PAC campaigns show
no PAC-speciﬁc learning, as the decrease in funding
likelihood for PAC campaigns is smaller, not larger,
than forKickstarter campaigns in general (Table 15). Put
differently, Kickstarter backers that experienced dam-
age in their ﬁrst campaign do care about this damage
(as evidenced by substantially lower likelihoods of
funding another campaign across all ﬁve dimensions),
but they do not attribute their bad experiences to cam-
paigns’ usage of PACs and thus do not speciﬁcally
avoid funding PAC campaigns in the future.
In summary, the above analyses examine the same
topic from very different angles but provide the same
conclusion: we do not see evidence of PAC-speciﬁc
consumer learning, neither on the population level
that is most relevant for regulators nor on the sub-
population or individual level.
5.4. Did Campaign Managers Take Measures that
Solved the Problem?
5.4.1. Analyses. Self-regulation in the context of our
study could include private self-regulation, by which
an individual enterprise regulates itself independent of
others, and industry self-regulation, by which enter-
prises decide to cooperate with each other and build
an industry-level organization that sets rules and
standards (Gunningham and Rees 1997). In reward-
based crowdfunding, such an industry-level organi-
zation currently does not exist. Because of this lack
of industry self-regulation (potentially indicatingmarket
participants’ lack of interest in addressing consumer
protection), we focus on private self-regulation by
campaign managers.
Self-regulation by campaign managers is closely
connected to signaling theory, by which enterprises
credibly communicate the level of some unobservable
element in a transaction by providing an observable
signal (Tang et al. 2008). For such a signal to be ef-
fective in a crowdfunding setting, it must be ob-
servable by backers and be difﬁcult (or too expensive)
to mimic by a low-quality campaign (Belleﬂamme
et al. 2014, Ahlers et al. 2015). The literature distin-
guishes between two types of signals: (1) default-
independent signals of self-regulation, which involve
an upfront expenditure in reputation building that
will be forfeited should product quality turn out to
be poor, and (2) default-contingent signals of self-
regulation, which do not involve any up-front ex-
penditure but place future proﬁts at risk (Rao et al.
1999, Kirmani and Rao 2000).
On Kickstarter, product quality is de facto unob-
servable to consumers when they make the decision
to fund the campaign. Hence, campaign managers
may try to signal credibility and convince consumers
with quality assurances. Such self-regulation by
campaign managers should be evident in a substantial
number of campaigns containing default-independent
signals like seal of approval (Tang et al. 2008) or code
of conduct (Wotruba 1997) and default-contingent sig-
nals likemoney back guarantee (Moorthy and Srinivasan
1995) and warranty (Kirmani and Rao 2000). We
identify campaigns using such signals by employing
a rule-based text mining approach on campaigns’ de-
scriptions and risk sections.
Table 12. Population-Level Learning: Results of Probit
Regression Analyzing Differences in Funding Likelihood
Between Recent (April to September 2016) vs. Older (April
to September 2015) PAC Campaigns After Successful PSM
After PSM Funding success (only PAC campaigns)
Recent campaign 1.029**
Intercept 34.864
Observations 340
Pseudo R-squared 0.031
Note. Year-month ﬁxed effects are included.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table 13. Population-Level Learning: Results of Probit Regression Analyzing Differences
in Increase in Funding Likelihood Between Recent (April to September 2016) vs. Older
(April to September 2015) PAC Campaigns vs. NoPAC Campaigns After Successful PSM
After PSM Funding success (all campaigns)
PAC campaign 0.232***
Recent campaign 0.142
Diff-in-Diff: PAC campaign x recent campaign 0.011
Intercept 9.459
Observations 1,640
Pseudo R-squared 0.007
Note. Year-month ﬁxed effects are included.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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5.4.2. Model-Free Evidence. Model-free evidence pre-
sented in Figure 4 shows that only 21 of 34,745 Kick-
starter campaigns (0.06%) in the games and tech-
nology categories provide default-independent signals
such as external certiﬁcations via some seal of approval.
An industry-wide codeof conduct is not adopted.Only 13
campaigns (0.04%) offer voluntary default-contingent
signals in the form of money-back guarantees or war-
ranties. We interpret the fact that in total, only 34 of the
34,745 Kickstarter campaigns studied (0.1%) use any of
the four signaling devices as indication for the absence
of effective self-regulation by campaign managers.
5.5. Did Kickstarter Take Measures that Solved
the Problem?
5.5.1. Analyses. Kickstarter has strong incentives to
protect consumer interests in order to maintain a
good reputation, in particular with repeat backers. If
backers become victims of deceptive behavior, they
will be less likely to support further campaigns. More
than 70% of all backers active in 2016 had previously
funded another Kickstarter campaign. As the plat-
form’s long-term viability is dependent on the sup-
port of these repeat backers, we might expect to
see self-regulation intended to protect consumers—
evident in a decrease (or even complete mitigation)
in damage to PAC backers following acts of self-
regulation by the platform.
We used 1,704 blog posts by Kickstarter to manu-
ally identify all major policy changes by Kickstarter
since 2009, listed in Figure 5. Of seven major pol-
icy changes identiﬁed, ﬁve can be classiﬁed as self-
regulation to beneﬁt the platform (compliance efforts
such as renaming of staff picks or change of incor-
poration; introduction of platform features beneﬁt-
ting campaign managers, such as the launch-now
feature). Only two policy changes can be classiﬁed
as self-regulation to beneﬁt consumers. The ﬁrst (and
smaller) change mandated the introduction of esti-
mated delivery dates in August 2011. The second
policy change aimed for increased consumer pro-
tection through consumer education and increased
requirements for campaign managers.
Neither of these proconsumer policy changes fo-
cuses on campaigns’ use of PACs. Hence, we could
simply conclude that the absence of such PAC-focused
changes already establishes a lack of platform self-
regulation in this regard. Still, the second procon-
sumer policy change implemented by Kickstarter
could have an indirect effect on PAC campaigns.
Announced in September 2012, the policy change
“Kickstarter is not a store” (Kickstarter 2012) man-
dated the inclusion of a “risk and challenges section”
and included new guidelines for campaigns in the tech-
nology and design categories. Most notably, the policy
Table 14. Subpopulation-Level Learning: Results of Expert
Survey Regarding Expected Relative Performance of
Campaigns Using Price Advertising Claims vs. Campaigns
Not Using Price Advertising Claims
Variable Mean SD Min p25 p50 p75 Max
Savings 4.516** 1.180 3 3 5 5 7
Delivery 4.548** 1.179 2 4 5 5 7
Delay 4.097n.s. 1.326 2 3 4 5 7
Product Quality 4.000n.s. 1.211 1 3 4 5 6
Notes. Results of structured, face-to-face interviews with 31 crowd-
funding experts. Answers are collected on a 7-point Likert scale, such
that lower numbers (1–3) signiﬁed a worse performance of PAC
(versus NoPAC) campaigns, 4 signiﬁed no expected difference be-
tween PAC and NoPAC campaigns, and higher numbers (5–7) sig-
niﬁed a superior performance of PAC (vs. NoPAC) campaigns.
n.s.p ≥ 0.10; *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table 15. Individual-Level Learning: Reductions in Funding Likelihood for Another Kickstarter Campaign in General vs.
Another Campaign that uses Price Advertising Claims (PACs) Among Backers that Experienced Damage vs. No Damage in
their ﬁrst PAC Campaign; Results after Successful Propensity Score Matching
After PSM Promised savings Actual savings Delivery Delay Product quality
Likelihood of funding another
Campaign
PAC
campaign Campaign
PAC
campaign Campaign
PAC
campaign Campaign
PAC
campaign Campaign
PAC
campaign
Outcome of ﬁrst PAC campaign
No damage 0.529 0.196 0.528 0.196 0.520 0.196 0.589 0.234 0.660 0.211
Damage 0.458 0.186 0.475 0.192 0.049 0.026 0.485 0.197 0.507 0.164
Drop in
funding
likelihood
–13.43% –5.23% –10.06% –2.28% –90.65% –86.86% –17.69% –15.66% –23.15% –22.48%
Number of
observations
68,400 155,684 17,644 181,210 51,716
Note. PAC-speciﬁc consumer learningwould require the drop in funding likelihood for “Another PAC campaign” to be signiﬁcantly larger than
the drop in funding likelihood for “Another campaign.”
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prohibited simulations and renderings of the prod-
uct and included a prototype requirement to protect
consumers from misleading campaign statements. The
prototype requirement might lead campaigns to form
a more accurate assessment of the production costs,
production timing, andproduct features,which could in
turn affect retail price (and hence savings), delivery
likelihood, and delay, as well as product quality.
The “Kickstarter is not a store” policy change did
not affect PAC campaigns directly, yet it might in-
directly improve the (relative) performance of PAC
(versus NoPAC) campaigns. Forcing campaigns to
create prototypes could lead to greater due diligence
before promising retail prices, delivery dates, and
product features, which could result in fewer differ-
ences between PAC and NoPAC campaigns after the
policy’s implementation. The policy change affected
campaigns in the technology category of our dataset
but not in the games category. We thus investigate
whether this act of self-regulation by the platformwas
followed by decreases in damage to consumers in the
treated category (technology) compared with the non-
treated category (games) and whether the decreases
(after policy change versus before) were greater for
PACversusNoPACcampaigns (difference-in-difference-
in-differences or DDD approach).
To identify the effect of the policy change on
damage to consumers, we employ a model with a
three-way-interacted dummy variable (DDD estimator;
Gruber 1994). The ﬁrst difference relates to the time of
the policy change (before and after September 20, 2012),
the second to the category (games or technology),
and the third to the use of PACs. We estimate a lin-
ear regression for continuous dependent variables
(savings, delay, product quality) and a probit re-
gression for the binary dependent variable (delivery),
with the three-way-interacted dummy variable as the
variable of interest (Gruber and Poterba 1994). In line
with previous analyses, we apply PSM to the four
groups (deﬁned by time of policy change and treat-
ment) and balance them on precampaign character-
istics respectively for PAC and NoPAC campaigns
(Ravallion and Chen 2005).
5.5.2. Model-Free Evidence. In Table 16, we present
model-free evidence on how the “Kickstarter is not
a store” policy change affected damage to backers
for PAC and NoPAC campaigns. Results are mixed.
Figure 4. (Color online) Model-Free Evidence from 34,745 Kickstarter Campaigns on Self-Regulation via Use of Quality Assurance
Signals by Campaigns Using Price Advertising Claims (PAC) vs. Campaigns Not Using Price Advertising Claims (NoPAC)
Figure 5. (Color online) Timeline of Kickstarter’s Major Policy Updates with Focus to Protect Consumers and the Platform
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Whereas PAC campaigns improved less than NoPAC
campaigns (before versus after the policy change)
regarding promised savings, actual savings, and
delivery likelihood, they developed more positively
than NoPAC campaigns with respect to delay and
product quality.
5.5.3. Results. We present the results of the ﬁve DDD
regressions after successful PSM in Table 17. TheDDD
estimator is not signiﬁcant in any of the ﬁve analyses. As
such, the ﬁndings of the formal analysis do not conﬁrm
themodel-free evidence, which pointed to some positive
and some negative changes for backers of PAC cam-
paigns. From the analyses, we conclude that backers
of PAC campaigns in the technology category did not
beneﬁt disproportionally from the “Kickstarter is not
a store” policy change, vis-a`-vis backers in NoPAC
campaigns in the technology category. Given that the
policy change did not speciﬁcally address PACs, this
ﬁnding is not surprising. Instead, we regard this as
additional evidence of the absence of effective plat-
form self-regulation to protect consumers.
6. Economic Relevance of Broken
PAC Promises
Broken PAC promises are a substantial and persistent
problem, but how big is their economic relevance? As
only a fraction of campaigns actually use PACs and
some of them keep their PAC promises, one might
wonder whether PACs really pose a relevant con-
sumer protection challenge in reward-based crowd-
funding. We therefore analyze the impact of broken
PAC promises along three dimensions: number of
affected campaigns, number of affected consumers,
and economic injury incurred by consumers.
Our analyses show that between 2009 and 2016,
296 different PAC campaigns have broken their
PAC promises—75.9% of all 390 PAC campaigns that
moved on to sell their product to the public. We thus
conclude that the problem is widespread and not
limited to a few black sheep.
In total, 569,507 backers invested in these cam-
paigns, suggesting that the problem affects a sub-
stantial number of consumers. Because of broken
PAC promises, these consumers experienced an av-
erage economic injury12 of $45.72 per backer. Class
action lawsuits ﬁghting broken PAC promises have
been granted (and won) on the basis of much smal-
ler injuries in the recent past (e.g., $36.03 in Spann
v. J.C. Penney Corp.; see Stempel 2015). Because the
problem is unresolved, consumers continue to pledge
money in Kickstarter campaigns that use PACs.
These consumers’ average expected economic injury
from a lack of promised savings is $14.8513—a con-
servative estimate, which takes into account that
some PAC campaigns keep their promises and that not
Table 16. Model-Free Evidence on Damage to Backers of Campaigns Using Price Advertising Claims (PAC) vs. Campaigns
Not Using Price Advertising Claims (NoPAC) Before and After the “Kickstarter is not a Store” Policy Change
Model-free PAC campaigns NoPAC campaigns Difference in means Observations
Campaigns with greater
improvement after policy change
Change in Promised Savings −0.319 0.079 −0.398*** 771 NoPAC
Change in Actual Savings −0.113 0.079 −0.192 771 NoPAC
Change in Delivery −0.017 0.021 −0.038 3,099 NoPAC
Change in Delay −60.734 −24.215 −36.519* 2,987 PAC
Change in Product Quality 0.021 −0.056 0.077 203 PAC
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table 17. Results of Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences (DDD) Analysis After Successful PSM Investigating Effect of
Kickstarter’s Largest Proconsumer Policy Change on Damage to Backers of Technology PAC Campaigns
After PSM Promised savings Actual savings Delivery Delay Product quality
Policy change −0.035 −0.031 0.112 −66.411*** 0.149*
Technology −0.095 −0.096 −0.270 −72.440*** 0.183**
PAC campaign −0.367** −0.099 −0.014 8.272 0.168
Policy change × technology 0.134 0.134 −0.015 62.563*** −0.169*
Policy change × PAC campaign −0.087 −0.082 −0.237 6.087 −0.155
Technology × PAC campaign 0.266 0.354 0.270 43.112 −0.359**
Policy change × technology × PAC campaign −0.198 −0.306 −0.567 −41.745 0.213
Intercept 0.684 0.758 −1.359 779.405*** 0.743
Observations 656 656 3,056 2,920 106
R-squared 0.141 0.020 0.045 0.026
Pseudo R-squared 0.037
Note. Year-month ﬁxed effects are included.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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all campaigns move on to sell their products to the
public (and backers hence do not suffer quantiﬁable
injury).
This article focuses on consumer protection relating
to PACs. Yet Kickstarter backers are also exposed to
other risks―most prominently, the often discussed
risk of nondelivery. In comparison with PACs, eco-
nomic injury from conﬁrmed nondelivery is larger
for each affected backer at $87.16 (=the average
Kickstarter price for campaigns that have announced
failure to deliver). The average expected economic
injury for each new backer, however, is only $4.58, as
the share of backers that experience nondelivery is
rather small.14
7. Summary and Implications
7.1. Summary
Kickstarter backers are currently not protected by
regulation pertaining to PACs. A campaign can ad-
vertise its product on Kickstarter as “Now only $70,
50% off the retail price” but later sell its product
via retailers for less than $140 without legal conse-
quences. Indeed, our analyses show that more than
75% of all games and technology campaigns on
Kickstarter that promised a discount broke their PAC
promises, leading to an average economic injury of
$45.72 per directly affected backer and an average
expected economic injury of $14.85 for each backer of
PAC campaigns. Even more severely, almost half of
all campaigns that promised a discount not only gave
a discount that was too low but did not give any
discount at all. And to make things worse for backers,
the average PAC campaign suffered from a lower
likelihood of ever delivering the product, from long
delays, and from low product quality. Backers’ re-
actions show that all of these problems are relevant.
Backers of PAC campaigns have worse sentiment
and higher complaint rates. Backers who experience
these damages ﬁrsthand display substantial drops in
funding likelihood for future Kickstarter campaigns.
The problem is widespread. We identify 569,507 con-
sumers affected by broken PAC promises in our data,
but the 34,745 games and technology campaigns we
analyze constitute only 16.5% of all Kickstarter cam-
paigns launched before September 2016. Kickstarter’s
biggest competitor, Indiegogo, saw another 126,234
campaigns launched in the same time frame. It thus
seems likely that many consumers beyond those iden-
tiﬁed in our study have experienced economic injury
frombrokenPACpromiseson crowdfundingplatforms.
Our analyses show that consumer protection does
not necessarily “happen automatically” without out-
side regulatory intervention if given enough time.
Instead, the evidence points toward a substantial,
persistent, and unresolved problemwith broken PAC
promises on Kickstarter more than six years after the
platform’s inception. We arrive at this conclusion
after (1) establishing the existence of a substantial
problem with broken PAC promises on Kickstarter,
(2) showing that these problems matter to affected
consumers, (3) ﬁnding no evidence of consumers
learning to avoid the problem, and (4) ﬁnding no
evidence of effective self-regulation by campaign
managers or (5) the Kickstarter platform.
7.2. Implications
Our study provides new insights into reward-based
crowdfunding. As one of the few articles to investi-
gate phenomena after successful funding, it is the ﬁrst
to study consumer protection. Our study suggests
that Kickstarter’s current lack of policies to protect
backers of PAC campaigns exposes consumers to
substantial damage. We observe lower backer senti-
ment and higher complaint rates across all PAC
campaigns, but negative effects from broken PAC
promises are not limited to campaigns. Similar to the
study of eBay by Nosko and Tadelis (2015), we ob-
serve that backers’ negative experiences with speciﬁc
campaigns spill over to the Kickstarter platform as a
whole. Backers who experienced damage in a par-
ticular campaign often leave Kickstarter altogether.
That Kickstarter has not successfully addressed bro-
ken PAC promises thus far not only hurts backers
but likely also hurts the Kickstarter brand.
Beyond Kickstarter, our study provides the ﬁrst
empirical evidence on the primarily theoretical and
conceptual literature on self-regulation (Ranchordas
2015). The particular setting of our empirical study
lets us reliably quantify the economic injury experi-
enced by consumers (Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corporation,
No. 11-55793) and allows us to observe market par-
ticipants’ behavior in an unregulated setting over a
rather long time period. Capitalizing on this setting
and using extensive data combining many different
angles on the topic, we add to the ongoing high-proﬁle
discussion among policy makers (Ohlhausen 2015,
European Commission 2017, Lagarde 2017) about
consumer protection in unregulated markets. Our re-
sults show that regulators cannot always count on
consumer learning or on enterprise self-regulation
to ensure consumer protection.
7.3. Limitations and Future Research
The empirical setup of this study comes with several
limitations. As highlighted in the introduction, this
article focuses on the consequences of PAC usage,
not on the antecedents. Through our survey of 179
campaign managers, we can rule out many potential
antecedents of PAC usage, such as product quality,
team quality, or ﬁnancing options (see Section 4.2
for details). Still, we acknowledge that a deeper
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understanding of PAC usage antecedents would be
desirable.
Similarly, we have limited insights into why PAC
campaigns break their promises. Our survey of cam-
paign managers provides no evidence of bad inten-
tions (i.e., campaigns intentionallymisleading backers).
Instead, it seems that different-than-anticipated cir-
cumstances after the campaign (i.e., when deter-
mining the retail price) leads campaigns to deviate
from the price they promised before the start of the
campaign. According to the survey, campaigns typ-
ically use either cost- or value-based pricing, andwith
both approaches, they might be better off offering
lower-than-promised retail prices. As highlighted in
Section 3.2, campaigns that promise discounts to
backers typically operate on lowermargins. If margin
pressure forces the campaign to identify cheaper-
than-planned production options, then campaigns
that use cost-based pricing will lower their retail
price accordingly. At the same time, margin pressure
might result in lower-than-planned product quality.
If campaigns use value-based pricing, lower prod-
uct quality will result in lower retail prices. Finally,
reference price effects might inﬂuence the retail price. As
one survey respondent noted, “Once a discount was
introduced, we were not able to sell the product at the
original price.” Future research on the antecedents of
PAC usage could provide further valuable insights
into the underlying mechanisms at play.
In the same vein, we provide suggestive but no
causal evidence as to why PAC campaigns come with
lower delivery likelihood, longer delays, and lower
product quality (see Section 3.2). Again, statements by
179 surveyed campaign managers point toward mar-
gin pressure and a lack of ﬁnancial cushion as po-
tential reasons. The identiﬁcation of the exact causal
mechanisms is another interesting topic for future
research.
Finally, while we can quantify economic injury
resulting frombrokenPACpromises in linewith current
regulatory guidelines, we cannot observe the total util-
ity a consumer derives from backing a Kickstarter
campaign. As a result, we must leave the assessment
of alternative regulatory scenarios (e.g., existing PAC
regulation is applied to Kickstarter or PACs are dis-
allowed on Kickstarter) to future research.
Acknowledgments
This article is based on the doctoral dissertation of the ﬁrst
author at Goethe University, Frankfurt. The authors are
grateful to Senior Editor Avi Goldfarb and the entire anon-
ymous review team for their comments and guidance. The
authors thank themany colleagues whose suggestions helped
in the development of this manuscript, speciﬁcally Christian
Catalini. The authors thank Zhuoer Qiu, Shunyao Yan, Yanyao
Zhu, and Fatemeh Zare for collecting and coding some of
the data.
Endnotes
1We contacted 588 campaign managers via Kickstarter to receive 179
responses (30% response rate). Campaign managers were selected
based on the use of PAC (equal proportions of PAC andNoPAC).We
further considered the disclosed country as well as the number,
success, and category of previous campaigns to create a represen-
tative sample of all campaign managers in our data set. We did not
provide incentives for answering our questions.
2 In line with the literature, we use simple ordinary least squares
regressions to assess potential omitted variable bias. We consider the
derived insights as helpful, even though this simple approach differs
from the analyses in our paper, where we carefully match campaigns
via PSM using nearest neighbor matching with caliper.
3We control for the robustness of ratings as an indicator of product
quality via a standard machine-learning technique and the LIWC
dictionary approach to extract the sentiment of the consumer review
texts. Results are essentially identical and are available on request.
4Observations for Actual Savings and Promised Savings:
NNoPAC  1,519  149 + 134 + 1,236; NPAC  390  66 + 12 + 312;
NTotal  1,909  1,519 + 390.
Observations for Delivery:
NNoPAC  7,231  213 + 7,018; NPAC  1,442  75 + 1,367;
NTotal  8,673  7,231 + 1,442.
Observations for Delay:
NNoPAC  7,018  2,069 + 4,949; NPAC  1,367  217 + 1,150;
NTotal  8,385  7,018 + 1,367.
Observations for Product Quality:
NNoPAC  283  149 + 134; NPAC  78  66 + 12;
NTotal  361  283 + 78.
5By the end of September 2016, 3,275 of the 11,948 successfully
funded games or technology campaigns on Kickstarter had neither
delivered nor ofﬁcially announced failure. Rather than speculate
about whether these campaigns will or will not deliver at a later
point in time, we decided to exclude them from our analyses of
delivery and focus on campaigns with certain outcomes only
(conﬁrmed delivery or announced failure to deliver). Our decision to
exclude these campaigns from the analyses does not affect the other
four metrics—Promised Savings, Actual Savings, Delay, Quality—as
all of these variables mandate the product to have been delivered. At
the same time, conditioning on successful delivery results in an im-
portant limitation, as all data on Promised Savings andActual Savings,
Delay, and Product Quality is right-censored.
6Backers’ ﬁrst PAC campaign is deﬁned based on the date of (non)
successful delivery of the product, not based on the date of successful
funding.
7The backer proﬁle pages were publicly disclosed on the Kickstarter
campaign pages until February 2016 and are available for all backers
with at least one comment in a campaign. We retrieved all information
from the publicly available and nondeleted proﬁles in December 2017.
Our ﬁnal dataset includes the full backer history of 442,185 backers
with 1,060,700 pledges in 3,297 PAC campaigns and covers on average
58.75% (median: 58.33%) of PAC campaign backers in our dataset.
8We match backers based on their experiences before supporting
their ﬁrst PAC campaign, using the number, categories, success
rate, average amount pledged, and currency of previous supported
campaigns aswell as the number of comments and the time of the ﬁrst
supported campaign. Backers that never supported a PAC campaign
are excluded from the analysis.
9We control for robustness of the LIWCdictionary approach by using
a standard machine-learning technique and different training data
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samples as input. Results are essentially identical and are available on
request.
10We deﬁned damage as follows: for savings, all campaigns that did
not adhere to the promised retail price (i.e., the measure is <0); for
delivery, all campaigns that did not deliver the product (known fail-
ures); for delay, all campaigns that did not keep the promised delivery
month; for product quality, all campaigns that have an average rating
on Amazon or Steam below the average of all ratings after delivery.
11As robustness checks, we performed the same analysis comparing
recent campaigns (April to September 2016, after “Coolest Cooler”)
with even older campaigns (April to September 2014, 2013, 2012) and
results are robust. Alternative estimationmethods (probit regressions
without year-month ﬁxed effects, χ2-test without prior PSM, logistic
regression without prior PSM but with precampaign variables as
controls) also yield the same ﬁndings. All robustness checks are
available on request.
12To calculate average economic injury per consumer, we ﬁrst cal-
culate campaign-level economic injury (= difference between prom-
ised price and retail price for the campaign * number of backers in
the campaign) for each campaign that did not honor promised savings.
We then sumcampaign-level economic injury across all campaigns and
divide by the total number of backers in PAC campaigns that did not
honor promised savings. This assessment of economic injury incurred
by consumers is in linewith current regulatory practices (e.g., Hinojos v.
Kohl's Corporation, No. 11-55793).
13To calculate average expected economic injury, we divided eco-
nomic injury across all PAC campaigns by the total number of
backers in PAC campaigns.
14The calculation of expected economic injury disregards all “not
delivered yet” campaigns that have not delivered despite being
delayed but that also have not announced failure to deliver. If we
assumed that 33% (66%, 100%) of these campaigns will not deliver,
the expected economic injury from nondelivery would increase to
$7.07 ($9.38, $11.62) per backer.
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